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Reflections on Bush v. Gore: The Role
of the United States Supreme Court
David Boies*
In our democracy, we give the most final decision-making au-
thority, over our most controversial issues, to our least democratic in-
stitution. Justices of the United States Supreme Court are never
elected, appointed for life, and free from the danger of recall. Once
appointed, they are as insulated from political pressures as our tradi-
tion and Constitution can accomplish.1 More than two centuries after
the ratification of the Constitution and its construction in Marbury v.
Madison,2 we tend to take for granted both the political insulation that
the Constitution provides and the preeminent role for the Court that
Marbury asserted.3 Although neither protection was inevitable,4 both
have stood the test of time. Indeed, it has been the power of the Court
to override the decisions of democratically elected executives and legis-
latures, 5 coupled with the justices' freedom from political sanction or
recall, that have made it possible for the Court to play the central role
it did in the Twentieth Century's expansion of human and civil rights.
It would have been possible to limit the doctrine of judicial
supremacy to issues of the balance of powers between branches of gov-
ernment and access to the political process,6 and to leave to elected
officials the resolution of other substantive rights. Preservation of the
* David Boies is the Chairman of Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP. His most recent
book is Courting Justice: From the New York Yankees v. Major League Baseball to Bush v.
Gore (Mirimax Books 2004). Mr. Boies argued on behalf of Vice-President Al Gore in the
Florida Supreme Court case (Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000)), and in the United
States Supreme Court case (Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)). This article is adapted from
remarks given October 5, 2004, to the American Constitutional Society at the Yale Law
School.
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour . ").
2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. Id. at 177 ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is.").
4. Most democracies, and most of our states, have rejected the U.S. Federal model of
lifetime judicial appointments; the breadth of Marbury's asserted role for the judiciary was,
at the time, unique among modem nations.
5. See Marbury, supra note 3, at 176-77.
6. Issues that relate to insuring the political process is fair and open, for example, and
that the system of checks and balances devised by the founders is preserved.
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right to vote,7 and to have those votes counted,8 is essential to having a
democratic process in which confidence can be reposed. But, if we as-
sume confidence in the openness and fairness with which the popular
will is expressed, what is the basis for substituting the judgment of
nine nonelected justices as to the scope and interpretation of the other
substantive rights guaranteed by the Constitution for the judgment of
elected legislators or an elected executive? It may be true, as a unani-
mous Court held in Cooper v. Aaron, that since Marbury, "the basic
principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the
law of the Constitution... [had] been respected by this Court and the
Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitu-
tional system."9 But what is the rationale for this principle?
There is a partial answer and a complete answer. The partial
answer is that the free and effective exercise of political rights, includ-
ing the right to participate in elections as both a voter and candidate,
will be affected by whether other substantive rights are enforced. The
Supreme Court, throughout the era of de jure segregation, forbade di-
rect interference with the right of blacks to vote. 10 However, the com-
bined effect of segregated schools, assemblies, accommodations, and
other aspects of society and politics precluded the meaningful partici-
pation of blacks in elections. Only by opening up schools and other
institutions and activities, and by scrutinizing voter qualifications
other than age for disproportionate effects, did the Court give practical
force to blacks' theoretical access to the political process. A division of
the ultimate power to interpret and enforce Constitutional guarantees
could stymie the Court's effort to assure the openness and fairness of
the democratic process.
The more complete answer is that the extent of the Court's iso-
lation from political influence is a condition of the Court's ability to
perform its Constitutional function. The provision of certain basic
rights in the Constitution is intended to override the will of the major-
ity. Entrusting the enforcement of those rights to persons who serve
7. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1, amends. XIV, § 2, XIV, § 1, XIX, XXIII, § 1, XXIV,
§ 1, XXVI, § 1 (deriving conventions for voting and admonishing any preclusion of the right
to vote based on race, sex, age of majority, or paying your taxes, et alia). But see Bush,
supra note 3, at 103, (emphasis added), "The individual citizen has no federal constitutional
right to vote for electors for the President of the United States unless and until the state
legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to implement its power to appoint
members of the electoral college."
8. See, e.g., Count Every Vote Act of 2005, S. 450, 109th Cong. (2005).
9. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (en banc).
10. See, e.g., U.S. v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965), Louisiana v. U.S., 380 U.S. 145
(1965).
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subject to that will, risks reducing Constitutional commands to preca-
tory advice. We would have waited a long time for Brown v. Board of
Education's prohibition of segregation"1 if we had been dependent on
democratically elected state or federal legislatures to enforce the Con-
stitutional mandate of Equal Protection.
Although important to the Court's role of guaranteeing minority
rights in a society based on majority rule, the justices' unique freedom
from political sanction carries the danger that power unconstrained by
free elections always carries: the danger that the person wielding that
power will use it to impose a personal agenda, or that the experience of
unconstrained power will lead the person to confuse his or her own
interests with those of the country.
There are three basic constraints on a justice's power. First, the
Court's power ultimately rests on the willingness of the people and
their elected legislators and executives to defer to the Court's deci-
sions. But today this is a limited constraint, particularly with respect
to any individual decision or even series of decisions. President An-
drew Jackson might ignore a Court ruling,12 but a modem President
would be unlikely to try. And while President Franklin Roosevelt's
"court-packing plan" probably could have been adopted if the Court it-
self had not "switched in time,"1 3 the combination of circumstances
that led to it (a country in crisis; one party with large legislative major-
ities, control of the executive branch, and strong popular support; a
series of court decisions that were widely regarded as preventing a so-
lution) are unusual. The tradition of deference to judicial supremacy
can be eroded over time, but such danger is a limited constraint in the
short run.
Second, the Court is a collegial institution - both in the sense
that it has multiple members who must reach a majority decision and
11. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
12. "John Marshall has made his decision. Now let him enforce it." Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S. 98, 158 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting President Jackson's response to
Worcester v. Georgia and the Court's efforts to protect the Cherokee Indians). See also
Robert W. Langran, From the Yearbook 1977 Supreme Court Historical Society (1976),
available at http://www.supremecourthistory.orgmyweb/77journallangran77.htm.
13. "The switch in time that saved nine" is the name given by the press to the apparent
sudden shift by Justice Owen J. Roberts from the conservative wing of the Supreme Court
to the liberal wing in the case West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937),
upholding a Washington State minimum wage law. The decision was handed down less
than two months after President Franklin Delano Roosevelt announced his Court-packing
Bill and it was widely seen as a reaction to that Bill. The switch, together with the
resignation of Justice Willis Van Devanter are often credited as contributing to the defeat of
the Bill, preserving the size of the Supreme Court.
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in the sense that the Court's procedures enforce interaction and discus-
sion. No single justice has power except as a participant in the process.
The constraint of the Court's collegiality is enhanced by the historical
absence of party-voting blocs.
The third, and perhaps the most important constraint, is an in-
dividual Justice's character, independence, and commitment to the
rule of law and principled decision-making qualities to be evaluated at
the time of appointment and confirmation. Judicial candidates are
often classified along two axes: a "conservative-liberal" axis and a "ju-
dicial activism-judicial restraint" axis. The first axis evaluates the
candidate's views, while the second axis evaluates the extent to which
the candidate believes it is appropriate for the judiciary to impose its
views on states and on other branches of the federal government. A
liberal judge can be an advocate of judicial activism, such as Earl War-
ren, or judicial restraint, such as Felix Frankfurter. The same is true
for a conservative judge. However, a third axis could be used to clas-
sify a judicial candidate as well: the extent to which the candidate is
committed to the rule of law and principled decision-making. Is the
person, for example, equally committed to judicial restraint (or judicial
activism) regardless of whether the result of such restraint (or activ-
ism) will be to advance a conservative or a liberal agenda?
The rule of law means, first, that what a court will do must be
reasonably predictable, and second, that what a court does must be
independent of the identity of the parties. A court's predictability
comes in part through adherence to precedent and principled decision-
making. This means that a decision ordinarily should be derived from
the principles of past decisions. It also means that the Court must be
willing to decide future cases according to the principles it uses to de-
cide today's case. Justice Scalia has been a particularly vocal advocate
of principled decision-making and has been an outspoken critic of jus-
tices he believes are unwilling to articulate, and abide by, consistent
principles. "[Wihen," he has said, "in writing for the majority of the
Court, I adopt a general rule, and say, 'This is the basis of our decision,'
I not only constrain lower courts, I constrain myself as well. If the next
case should have such different facts that my political or policy prefer-
ences regarding the outcome are quite the opposite, I will be unable to
indulge those preferences; I have committed myself to the governing
principle."14
14. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179
(1989).
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We believe that whether or not we agree with a decision of the
Court, that decision reflects the justices' best principled judgment as to
how that case, and every case, should be decided under the law- that
the justices are not seeking a particular result in a particular case for
personal or political reasons. Judges, unlike legislators, are limited in
the extent to which they can pursue what they personally conclude is
in the country's interest. Elected legislators can, and are supposed to,
enact whatever laws they believe serve the public interest; voters
choose legislators who they believe will act in a way consistent with
what the voters want, and they can replace legislators who do not.
That is the way a representative democracy works.
However, precisely because the Court is neither elected nor sub-
ject to recall, its legitimacy, and our long-term willingness to accept its
pronouncements, is based on the faith that it will interpret the coun-
try's laws (including the Constitution) based on consistent legal princi-
ples. The interpretation of our laws, and particularly our Constitution,
will necessarily be influenced by justices' personal conclusions as to
what principles best serve our society. However, we trust that that
influence will be constrained by the requirement that each interpreta-
tion be grounded in principles that are generally applicable-princi-
ples derived from past opinions, and principles that the judges are
prepared to apply in the future. Legislators are not required to be con-
sistent; judges are.
Accordingly, when a judge decides a case inconsistently with his
or her prior opinions, when an opinion ignores undisputed facts incon-
sistent with its result, when a judge decides a case based on principles
he or she is not prepared to apply to future cases, or decides a case to
achieve a result rather than confirm or extend settled principles of law,
the judge impairs the trust that is the source of the court's power. The
judge also forces legislators increasingly to politicize the process of ju-
dicial selection; if judges' act as political agents, their successors will
inevitably be required to pass political tests at the time of their
selection.
The Supreme Court's worst opinions in the first two hundred
years were decisions like Dred Scott,15 Plessey v. Ferguson,1 6 and the
Japanese internment cases,1 7 where the Court abandoned principled
decision-making to reach a politically palatable result. In Dred Scott,
the 1857 Court decided that slaves were property and slaves who es-
15. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 Howard) 393 (1856).
16. Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
17. See e.g., Toyosaburo Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
2006]
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caped to the North could not become citizens because they remained
the property of their "owners."' In 1896, the Plessy Court upheld the
right of states to segregate citizens based on race and (in dicta that was
widely applied) to require black and white children to go to different
schools. 19 In 1944, the Court in Korematsu upheld the right of the gov-
ernment during World War II to force all citizens of Japanese ancestry
into concentration camps without any evidence of disloyalty or any evi-
dence of misconduct. 20 To some extent each of these decisions was
based on racism that at least certain justices shared with society at
large. 2' However, to an even greater extent, the decisions reflected the
Court's perceived need to reach a politically acceptable result. Each of
the opinions drew vigorous dissents that would later be vindicated.
One recent case in which the Court arguably abandoned princi-
pled decision-making and used its position as the final arbiter of con-
stitutional issues for partisan political purposes was Bush v. Gore.
22
The case arose out of Florida's attempt to recount punch-card ballots in
the 2000 presidential election. Bush, whose few hundred vote lead in
Florida was diminishing as the recount progressed, asked the courts to
stop the recount on the ground that individual county canvassing
boards were in some but not all counties counting ballots which had
not been punched through completely, but where the voter's intent
could be determined by the pattern of indentations or partial punches.
The problem was created by the fact that Florida law for at least 80
years had said Canvassing Boards should examine ballots to determine
the "intent of the voters" regardless of whether the voters had marked
their ballots properly, 23 but did not specify how the Boards should as-
certain that intent. The result was that different boards exercised
their discretion somewhat differently, just as government officials and
juries routinely do in matters from whether a driver's license should be
revoked to whether a defendant should be put to death.
There were sensible arguments for why machine counts should
be preferred to human recounts - machines would, the evidence
showed, fail to count a number of votes where the voter's intent was
clear, but the machines were at least neutral. There were not Republi-
18. Dred Scott, 60 U.S at 452.
19. Plessey, 163 U.S. at 551-52 (1896).
20. Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. at 225.
21. Justice McReynolds, in his dissent in Missouri v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 353 (1938),
argued against weakening segregation on the ground that integration would "as indicated
by experience, damnify both races."
22. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2002).
23. See Fla. Stat. § 102.166.
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can machines or Democrat machines, while a person's political prefer-
ence might influence his or her subjective decision as to a voter's
"intent." Nevertheless, Florida (and thirty-three other states) had long
provided for human recounts. The question was not what the Florida
rule was; it was not even what the Florida rule should be as a matter of
policy. The question was whether the rule Florida had adopted was
Constitutional.
Bush's arguments to stop the recount before it was completed
were rejected by the Florida Supreme Court,24 the federal District
Court in Florida,25 and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
26
However, on December 9, 2000, a five-justice majority of the Supreme
Court issued an order enjoining the recount until the Court had an
opportunity to consider the merits of Bush's claim.27 On December 13,
the same five-justice majority upheld Bush's claim on Equal Protection
grounds and declared an end to the recount effort.
28
The majority opinion conceded that punch-card machines pro-
duced "an unfortunate number of ballots" where voters tried to vote
but their ballots could not be counted by machines; but it held that
there was now no remedy for this "unfortunate" forfeiture of the right
of citizens to have their votes counted because the Florida recount in-
volved human discretion which different counters applied differently.
29
The majority opinion tried to limit the applicability of its Equal Protec-
tion Clause ruling to this case alone.
30
The four dissenting justices all emphasized their view that the
majority opinion abandoned principled decision-making. A dissent by
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer declared
[w]hen questions arise about the meaning of state laws, including
election laws, it is our settled practice to accept the opinions of the
highest courts of the States as providing the final answers. On rare
occasions, however, either federal statutes or the Federal Constitu-
tion may require federal judicial intervention in state elections.
This is not such an occasion. The federal questions that ultimately
emerged in this case are not substantial.31
This dissent went on to observe,
24. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (2000).
25. Siegel v. LePore, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
26. Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2000).
27. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000).
28. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
29. Id. at 110-112.
30. Id. ("Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances.").
31. Id. at 123.
2006]
FLORIDA A&M UNIV. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1:1:105
[n]or are petitioners correct in asserting that the failure of the Flor-
ida Supreme Court to specify in detail the precise manner in which
the 'intent of the voter,' Fla. Stat. §101.5614(5) (Supp.2001), is to be
determined rises to the level of a constitutional violation. 32
The dissent noted that the majority of states approached the
issue of determining the intent of the voter the way Florida did and
pointed out that:
[w]e have never before called into question the substantive stan-
dard by which a State determines that a vote has been legally cast.
And there is no reason to think that the guidance provided to the
factfinders, specifically the various canvassing boards, by the "in-
tent of the voter" standard is any less sufficient - or will lead to
results any less uniform - than, for example, the "beyond a reasona-
ble doubt" standard employed every day by ordinary citizens in
courtrooms across this country.
33
The dissenters also emphasized the fact (ignored by the major-
ity opinion despite its emphasis in briefs and oral argument) that "a
single impartial magistrate will ultimately adjudicate all objections
arising from the recount process."34 The dissenters concluded,
[a]lthough we may never know with complete certainty the identity
of the winner of this year's Presidential election, the identity of the
loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation's confidence in the judge as
an impartial guardian of the rule of law. 35
Justice Souter filed his own dissenting opinion. He began,
"Itihe court should not have reviewed either Bush v. Palm Beach
County Canvassing Bd. (per curiam), or this case, and should not have
stopped Florida's attempt to recount all undervote ballots .. ,"36 He
went on to describe the majority opinion as "another erroneous deci-
sion."37 He noted that if the majority had not stopped the recount, the
entire issue might well have already been satisfactorily resolved.3s
Justice Ginsburg, who had joined in Justice Stevens' dissent,
filed an additional dissent in which she carefully analyzed how the
cases cited in the majority's opinion failed to support their conclu-
sions. 39 She gently noted the inconsistency between the majority's
opinion and the traditional advocacy of federalism and deference to
32. Id. at 124.
33. Bush, 531 U.S. at 125.
34. Id. at 126.
35. Id. at 128-29.
36. Id. at 129.
37. Id.
38. Bush, 531 U.S. at 135.
39. Id. at 139-40.
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state courts by the five justices who constituted that majority, "[w]ere
the other members of this Court as mindful as they generally are of our
system of dual sovereignty, they would affirm the judgment of the Flor-
ida Supreme Court."40 The Justice went on to observe that the peti-
tioners had "not presented a substantial equal protection claim" and
that, even if they had, there was no justification for the majority not
permitting the recount to proceed. 41
Justice Breyer, who had also joined in Justice Stevens' dissent,
filed a separate opinion as well. "The Court was wrong," he began, "to
take this case. It was wrong to grant a stay."42 The Justice noted "the
absence of any record evidence that the recount could not have been
completed in the time allowed by the Florida Supreme Court. '43 He
also emphasized that
in a system that allows counties to use different types of voting sys-
tems, voters already arrive at the polls with an unequal chance that
their votes will be counted. I do not see how the fact that this re-
sults from counties' selection of different voting machines rather
than a court order makes the outcome any more fair.44
As the dissents emphasized, the majority abandoned virtually
every rule the Court ordinarily follows in deciding cases. It did so by:
* disregarding a state Supreme Court's interpretation of state law;
" intervening before the Florida process had been completed and a
record fully developed;
" prohibiting Florida from recounting ballots prior to a decision on
the merits;
" deciding issues that had not been fully and fairly litigated in the
court from which the appeal was taken;
" allowing an appellant not only to raise arguments on appeal not
made below but to rely on arguments contrary to positions taken
below;
" ignoring normal requirements for record evidence and findings to
support factual determinations;
" ignoring admissions and concessions in the court below; and
* presuming that the procedures established in Florida to assure
uniformity, including judicial supervision and a review of dis-
puted interpretations by a single judge, would not work (without
waiting to see whether they in fact worked).
40. Id. at 142-43.
41. Id. at 143.
42. Id. at 144.
43. Bush, 531 U.S at 146 (emphasis in original).
44. Id. at 147.
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Yet, that was not all, or even the most important thing, that
was wrong. The majority's equal protection decision was contrary to
principles used to construe the Equal Protection Clause in prior cases,
particularly in opinions in which the Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas joined. Moreover, all five Justices in the ma-
jority explicitly recognized that they would be unwilling to apply the
principles of Bush v. Gore to other cases, and declared that this was a
decision for this case only.
45
In addition, the undisputed fact was that the different types of
voting machines used in different counties had a much greater effect
on whether a vote would be recorded than any difference in the inter-
pretation of what represented the intent of the voter. If it was, as the
majority ruled, a violation of equal protection to give voters in one
county a greater chance to have their ballots counted than to voters in
another county, then it was a violation of equal protection for Florida
to have different voting machines in different counties. The majority
opinion never dealt with this inconsistency.
The majority also ignored the fact that the procedure estab-
lished in Florida provided each side an opportunity to object to any
ballot that it thought was improperly counted (or not counted) and pro-
vided that all unresolved disputes would be decided by a single judge.
This procedure went to the heart of the majority's conclusion that the
Florida process would inevitably result in unacceptably large differ-
ences in how ballots were treated from county to county.46 If Bush
failed to file a contest, or failed to object to the way certain ballots were
counted on December 9th, there was no case to decide; if Bush did file a
contest, or make an objection, Florida had established a procedure to
resolve the issue. In addition, the majority's opinion depended on the
assumption that the ultimate treatment of ballots during the recount
would vary materially from county to county. It was hard to reconcile
that assumption with the procedures established by Judge Lewis. The
majority simply ignored those procedures.
Finally, if there has been one guiding principle of the jurispru-
dence of Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, and to a lesser extent
O'Connor and Kennedy, it has been the overriding importance of feder-
alism and states' rights. The need to defer to state courts has been
used to justify case after case limiting the protection that federal law,
including the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses, was earlier
thought to provide. They are not deciding, and are not supposed to
45. Id. at 109.
46. Id at 106-07.
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decide, what the best rule might be, the justices have argued-they
must defer to the state courts in the name of federalism. The justices
have argued, among other things, that federalism requires deference to
a state's decision regarding everything from gay rights and abortion. to
how prisoners are treated and whether guns should be permitted in
the vicinity of public schools. If federalism means anything, it must
mean that the states have the right to make decisions the U.S. Su-
preme Court would not make if it were sitting as a state court. In Bush
v. Gore, the majority was unwilling to defer to the Florida court unless
that court ruled the way the majority wanted it to rule.
It is also doubtful whether the majority's opinion met the rule-
of-law requirement that decision-making be independent of the iden-
tity of the parties. Even conservative constitutional scholars have con-
ceded that they doubt the result would have been the same if the case
had been Gore v. Bush, with Gore leading in the vote count and trying
to get the Supreme Court to stop manual recounts requested by the
Republicans and ordered by a state supreme court.
Justices may, and sometimes do, come to the Court from parti-
san political backgrounds, but we as a nation hope and expect that par-
tisanship ends with their appointment. During the more than two
hundred years of our Republic, that hope and expectation has been ful-
filled to a surprising extent. In particular, the Court has avoided using
the unique power it has been given to influence elections for the Presi-
dent that will appoint their successors, leaving to the states and ulti-
mately Congress the resolution of any disputes. Indeed, it is because
the Congress is a political body whose members are responsible to the
voters that both Article II of the Constitution and 3 U.S.C. § 5 provide
that it shall be the institution to resolve controversies concerning a
state's presidential electors. If no candidate received a majority of elec-
toral votes and the contest had to be decided by Congress, each mem-
ber of Congress would have been free to vote for the candidate he or
she personally favored. That freedom, however, is not afforded to the
nonelected and unrecallable justices of the Supreme Court, whose
power rests on the presumption that they will decide cases not upon
their preferences, but upon legal principles applied consistently. It is
the perception that Bush v. Gore was decided to achieve a political re-
sult rather than as the result of the neutral application of legal princi-
ples that has led to its widespread criticism.
Bush v. Gore now appears more likely to become "an isolated
deviation from the strong current of precedents - a derelict on the
2006]
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waters of the law,"47 than either a serious expansion of Equal Protec-
tion law or the beginning of a pattern of federal judicial intervention in
deciding elections. But, however it is viewed, Bush v. Gore underscores
the Court's enormous power and the importance of the criteria used to
select and confirm justices.
47. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 232 (1957) (J. Frankfurter dissenting).
